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Abstract
This paper aims to present and discuss some values in theory construction and the
resulting methodological and rhetorical strategies adopted by behavioral economics in
search of improved explanations and predictions of choice behavior. Its point of departure
is the conjecture that changes in theorizing and methodological perspectives are motivated
by doubts about whether the resemblance between the standard economic model of choice
and reality is close enough given the purposes of explanation and prediction.
To undertake the foregoing task, it focuses attention on the terms of the debate
about why (and how) to reform the behavioral foundations of the basic model of
intertemporal choice (i.e. constant discounted utility model). More importantly, it will
advance the thesis that behavioral economists' way of using experimental data to test
and justify the hyperbolic discounting hypothesis is rather persuasive and has contributed
to improved explanation of intertemporal choice anomalies, though it involves important
methodological challenges.
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Resumo
Este artigo apresenta e discute alguns valores de teoriza c~ ao e as resultantes estrat egias
metodol ogicas e ret oricas adotadas pelos adeptos da economia comportamental em busca
de melhores explica c~ oes e previs~ oes do comportamento decis orio. O seu ponto de partida
 e a conjectura de que mudan cas nas perspectivas metodol ogicas e te oricas surgem a
partir das d uvidas sobre se a aproxima c~ ao entre o modelo econ^ omico convencional de
escolha racional e a realidade  e sucientemente adequada para satisfazer os prop ositos de
previs~ ao e explica c~ ao. Para efetuar a tarefa, o presente trabalho concentrar a aten c~ ao
sobre os termos do debate sobre como e por que revisar as bases psicol ogicas do
modelo convencional de escolha intertemporal (i.e. o modelo de utilidade descontada
contante). Mais fudamentalmente, ser a defendida a tese de que a maneira dos economistas
comportamentais testarem e justicarem a hip otese de desconto hiperb olico  e bastante
persuasiva e tem contribuido para a compreens~ ao de anomalias da escolha intertempral,
mas ainda envolve v arios desaos metodol ogicos.
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Rhetorically self-conscious argument, when all is said, is something like growing
up. Perhaps the time has come, after a useful childhood spent in positivism, for
economics to grow up, too.
McCloskey, 1994, p. 396
It is plainly and patently bad social science that we don't care about how realistic
our assumptions are.
Rabin, 2002, p. 672
1. Introduction
This paper aims to present and discuss some values in theory construction and the
resulting methodological and rhetoric strategies adopted by behavioral economics
in search of more realistic representations (i.e. models) of decision-making in
the real economic world. Its point of departure is the view that changes in
theorizing and methodological perspectives are motivated by doubts about whether
the resemblance between the standard economic model of choice and reality is
close enough given the purposes of explanation and prediction. To undertake
this complex task, I focus attention on the terms of the debate over reforms
of the behavioral foundations of the basic model of intertemporal choice (i.e.
constant discounted utility model) and why and how behavioral economists use
experimental data to test and justify their alternative hypothesis of non-constant
time discounting.
The paper will be structured as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model
of intertemporal choice and discusses some issues that are at stake in the
debate over `realism' of its underlying assumptions. Inspired by Ariel Rubinstein's
(2005) remarks about the actual practice of behavioral economics, Section 3
discusses methodological problems that are often neglected (and ignored) by
behavioral economists, such as the usage of experimental results to test and justify
assumptions, and appeal to animal studies and neuroscientic experiments to
persuade their fellow economists about the `goodness' of their hypotheses and
models. Section 4 suggests that further explanatory progress depends on reformist
theorizing strategies that shift from incremental relaxation of constant utility
models to consistent eorts to open up the `black box' of decision machinery. Section
5 wraps the overall argument up and concludes.
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2. The Standard Account of Intertemporal Choice and the Debate
over its Unrealistic Assumptions 1
Intertemporal choice is a pervasive phenomenon of economic relevance. This
might be so because a great deal of human action often involves consequences
that are spread over time and conicting present and future preferences (utilities).
Contemporary orthodox economists often appeal to Samuelson's 1937 model
of discounted utility (henceforth: DU model) to explain/predict patterns of
intertemporal choice. The model is built on some idealizing or simplifying
assumptions that do not serve to oer a complete description of the complex
phenomenon of choice over time. 2 Rather, the unrealistic assumptions of the
constant DU model might serve to isolate those explanatory factors that are
thought to play major roles in intertemporal patterns of behavior. 3
The constant DU model assumes that, for any two intertemporal consumption
proles ct = (c1;c2:::;cn) and c0
t = (c0
1;c0
2:::;c0
n);ct is preferable to c0
t if and only if,
X
U(ct)t 
X
U(c0
t)t
Where U(:) is a utility function, and t a discount function that 0 < t < 1.
The DU model is built on two critical assumptions. One states that individual's
utility at a particular time only depends on consumption at that time. In this case,
if an intertemporal consumption prole (d1;d2;:::;dn) and another (e1;e2;:::;en)
have the same outcome at a certain time, the preference is determined by (n   1)
outcomes. The independence assumption is important because it allows for U(X) = P
ut(xt). Due to independence assumption, the model implies that outcomes
are discounted at the same rate. The model also assumes that preferences are
stationary. It implies that any individual has a neutral response to time delay, i.e.,
any time delay has the same impact on her preferences and therefore discounting
occurs at an exponential (constant) rate.
Behavioral economists complain that the standard model of choice over time {
the discounted utility model { oers a very poor description of actual behavior
because it is based on too unrealistic assumptions. The assumptions of stationary
preferences and independence yield a positive consequence to the task of modeling.
It suggests that individual preferences are time invariant, i.e., the weight an
individual gives to her current and future utilities do not change. Yet two
1 This section is very much based on Muramatsu (2006).
2 According to M aki (1993), idealizing assumptions state that some forces or causes are powerless,
i.e., they have no impact or a null eect on a selected phenomenon to be explained. Their role is to
theoretically isolate the causal inuence of a factor from any other existing (less important) elements.
One famous example of idealizing assumption underlying Galileu's law of falling bodies is that the eect
of air pressure is zero.
3 According to Samuelson,
It is completely arbitrary to assume that an individual behaves so as to maximize an integral of the form
envisaged in [DU]. This involves the assumption that every instance in time the individual's satisfaction depends
only upon consumption at that time, and that furthermore, the individual tries to maximize the sum of
instantaneous satisfactions to some comparable base by time discount (Samuelson 1937, p. 159).
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problematic consequences arise { these assumptions imply that all the complex
psychology of intertemporal choice is reduced to a well behaved discount factor
and individual preferences are time-independent. Despite the analytical tractability
that the foregoing assumptions yield, there is much empirical evidence suggesting
that in the actual world individual's preference are not stable over time and are
independent from past, current and future consumption.
2.1. The behavioral economist's terms of the debate over unrealistic psychological
assumptions
It is at the core of behavioral economics a concern with improving the quality
of predictions as well as explanations of actual choice behavior (Camerer and
Loewenstein 2003, p. 3). Behavioral economists claim that they aim to make
economic analysis as psychologically realistic as possible. Some even suggest: \the
more realistic our assumptions about economic actors, the better our economics"
(Rabin 2002, p. 658). In so doing they seem to capitalize on Herbert Simon's
critique of the methodology of positive economics following Friedman's aphorism
{ the better the economic theory or model, the more unrealistic its assumptions
(Simon 1997). Behavioral economists regard unrealistic assumptions as `necessary
evil' rather than virtue. This paper puts forth the idea that the terms of the debate
over unrealistic psychological assumptions serve rhetorical purposes. 4 Behavioral
economists aim to challenge the positivist trend in economics that recommended
accounts of choice behavior free from non-tractable psychological entities (e.g.
emotion, attention, memory and learning). In so doing they neglect that some
unrealistic behavioral assumptions serve to separate those major (even essential)
features of a slice of reality under study from the rest of the world (M aki 1993). With
this in mind, it might be worth presenting the main assumptions of the standard
explanation of intertemporal choice and the roles they play in a systematic fashion.
2.2. Unrealistic behavioral assumptions of the DU model and their functions
The main assumptions underlying the DU approach can be presented in the
following way (Muramatsu 2006): 5
A1. Integration of new course of action with previously existing consumption plans
The agent does not evaluate prospects in isolation, but based on how a particular
new alternative can change his or her pattern of consumption in all periods.
A2. Utility Independence { The agent's overall utility is identical to the discounted
sum of the utilities in each period of time. In this case, the agent is thought to
exhibit no special preference for patterns of utility across time.
4 Following McCloskey (1994), I do not regard rhetoric as mere fancy talk with empty content.
Alternative, the term is used in the Aristotelian sense { an art of a good argument capable of changing
the prior value and belief structure of a particular audience concerned with certain phenomena.
5 My list of DU assumptions is based on Frederick et al. (2003).
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A3. Consumption Independence { An individual's utility associated with
consumption of a good at a period t+k is independent of her or his consumption
in any other period. Therefore, one's comparison between her consumption at
period  and 0 (i.e. her marginal rate of substitution) is completely independent
of consumption in 00.
A4. Discounted utility function is stationary, constant across time { The agent's
well-being associated with any consumption or activity is identical in dierent
periods of time.
A5. The agent's time preference discounting is independent from her or his
consumption { The discounted utility function is not responsive to dierent types
of consumption. This means that the agent is assumed not to discount utility
from dierent sources and at dierent rates.
A6. The agent's discounting is constant and her or his intertemporal preferences
are consistent { The individual evaluates time in an even-handed fashion, i.e., if
in a period t she or he prefers A at period  to B at period  + d (for a certain
 and a constant amount d), then in any period t she or he also opts for A at 
to B at  + d for all possible  This implies that individual preferences between
outcomes are not changed if outcomes are delayed or anticipated by a common
factor.
A7. The individual's marginal utility is decreasing { The utility function is
concave, i.e., individuals are thought to spread their patterns of consumption
over time.
A8. Individuals have positive time preferences { The agent's discount rate is
positive, i.e., it assumes that agent's preferences are biased towards immediate
consumption (rather than future and higher gratication).
It is important to stress that the assumptions A1 to A8 play quite specic
roles in theorizing and explanation of intertemporal decision-making. Together
these assumptions remove some factors from the set of explanatory items (i.e.
explanantia) that are thought to play minor (if any) role in intertemporal choice.
In the next section, I will show that many of the above assumptions will be
relaxed once economists and psychologists have doubts about their capacity to
isolate explaining factors that are sucient or even necessary for an adequate
representation of actual choice over time. Before that it might be useful to elaborate
a bit on what explaining items the DU model seems to include and to exclude.
To undertake this task, I pay some attention to the functions of the DU model's
assumptions.
Pointing out that an assumption helps exclude a factor is not to yet to
justify such exclusion. Other tools are needed for the latter task. To meet this
purpose, I am employing the classication of assumptions based on what claims
they help make: negligibility assumption, applicability assumption, and early-step
assumption (Musgrave 1981; M aki 2000). More recently, Hindriks (2005) proposes
to supplement Musgrave-M aki's classication of assumptions by including another
important type of assumption that is justied by claims about tractability, viz.
tractability assumption.
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A negligibility assumption justies the exclusion of a certain explanatory factor
(F) based on the belief that its eect on the phenomenon under study is negligibly
small given the model's purposes. In this case, claims about negligibility can be
true or false and it is an empirical matter to inquire into their truth status.
Some behavioral economists often seem to imply that a factor excluded by the
conventional model of choice like non-constant discounting has non-negligible
impact on behavior, therefore should be included in an improved theoretical
representation of choice over time. An applicability assumption justies the
exclusion of a certain explanatory factor based on the idea that a model or
theory applies only if the factor is absent. This type of assumption diers from
claims about negligibility since the excluded item is thought to play signicant
(non-negligible) roles in production of the phenomenon under study. Yet the
application of the model/theory is possible only in cases where the factor is not
present, or is present but negligibly weak. Applicability assumptions can be either
true or false but behavioral researchers, for the sake of empirical testability, work
hard to come up with assumptions that are true as often as possible (M aki 2000,
p. 325). An early step assumption justies the exclusion of a factor based on
the vision that, perhaps for analytical convenience, one rst removes a certain
explanatory item F and will incorporate it into the previously selected set of
explainers once a model or theory is further developed. Finally, a tractability
assumption is imposed for reasons of tractability, i.e. it is imposed to circumvent
some tractability problems associated with formal derivation of a well-behaved
objective function, determination of boundary conditions, and so forth. In the next
lines I show that, most of the time, economists (behavioral economists included)
impose some psychological assumptions due to reasons of negligibility, tractability
and applicability. I go on to suggest that behavioral economists and economic
psychologists are very aware that relaxation of some DU assumptions, often justied
in terms of tractability and neglibility claims might be conducive to the attainment
of progress (Frederick et al. 2003).
I take the integration assumption (A1) as an example of applicability assumption.
This means that the DU model is only applicable to situations in which individuals
can integrate new options with his or her existing consumption plans (i.e.
when integration holds). It may be with this in mind Frederick, Loewenstein
and O'Donoghue emphasize that integration is a central assumption in most
models of intertemporal assumption; it guarantees the possibility of theoretical
representations of judgments and decisions over time (2003, p. 20).
Utility independence (A2) can be regarded as a negligibility assumption. It
seems to suggest that the explanatory factor `the agent's well-being in period t
is dependent on her or his past, current and expectations of future well-being' play
negligibly small eects on intertemporal choice given the DU model's cognitive
purposes and for that reason it can be excluded. This assumption seems to be
justied by the belief that only discounting shapes distribution of utility across
time in a signicant fashion. With this in mind, economists can entertain the idea
that the overall utility of a sequence of outcomes is identical to the discounted sum
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of utility. This assumption is not very discussed by economists but this may be
because it reects economists' concern with removing any type of preference for
patterns of utility over time because this might bring some tractability problems.
If this is so, the imposition of A2 might also be interpreted in terms of tractability
reasons.
Consumption independence (A3) is a quite famous DU assumption. It is also
justied by the idea that the explanatory factor 'individual's comparison between
consumption of two goods is dependent on her or his past consumption and
estimated future consumption' can be ignored since it exerts negligible eects on the
occurrence of patterns of intertemporal behavior with economic relevance. It implies
that individuals' preferences over certain intertemporal consumption proles are
not aected by the nature of consumption. This is one of the most debated DU
assumptions, since it is consistent with the idea that an agent's preference between
a Japanese restaurant and a French one tonight is independent on whether she
or he ate French yesterday (or expect it to have it at tomorrow's dinner). Many
challenged the empirical accuracy of consumption independence. The very father of
the DU model recognized the inexistence of a compelling reason for `consumption
independence'. A3 can be interpreted as a false assumption and this is implied
by Samuelson's claim that `the amount of wine I drank yesterday and will drink
tomorrow can be expected to have eects on my today's indierence slope between
milk and wine (Samuelson 1952, p. 674). Yet consumption independence was not
relaxed until the 1980s. In my own interpretation, this is largely so because this
assumption circumvents the problem of deriving a tractable and well-behaved
discounted utility model. If this is so, there are also grounds for regarding A3 as
a tractability assumption. Nowadays behavioral economists realize that the claims
about negligibility and tractability associated with A3 can be challenged. This
assumption removes an explanatory item that are signicant (rather than causally
unimportant) for the occurrence of actual behavior.
The stationary instantaneous (discounted) utility (A4) also seems to be an
assumption that involves claims about negligibility and tractability. Its exclusion
of the explanatory factor `individual preferences change over time in predictable
and non-predictable manners' seems to be justied by the idea that its impact on
patterns of behavior at the economy level is negligibly small. A4 is also imposed for
tractability reasons. By excluding the explanatory factor `preferences change over
time', it allows for a tractable discounted utility function (Frederick et al. 2003).
Independent discounting from consumption (A5) is a clear example of tractability
assumption. It seems to justify the exclusion of a non-negligible (signicant)
explanatory item, viz. `utility discounting is made at dierent rates and depends
on the agent's perception of the nature and type of consumption' by the idea
that a tractable model of intertemporal choice is only possible when the agent's
discount function has a particular property { it is invariant across all types of
consumption. (Frederick et al. 2003, p. 22) suggest that if this assumption does
not hold, the very notion of unitary time preferences loses its bite. This might
bring tractability problems to economic models of intertemporal choice, since
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characterization of a time preference becomes dependent on the thing being delayed,
such as `chocolate time preference', `summer vacation time preference', and so forth.
If this is so, tractability seems to be a crucial (pragmatic) consideration for imposing
an unrealistic (false) assumption like A5.
Constant discounting (A6) seems to be a negligibility assumption. It excludes the
factor `individuals have conicting preferences' from the explanatory set based on
the belief that its eect on behavior patterns within the economy is negligibly small.
It is also likely that tractability considerations also serve as reasons for imposing
A6. Frederick et al. emphasize that if the assumption constant discounting is not
imposed, formal characterization of an individual's time preferences will become
less tractable since it may require specication of an entire discount function and
individual time preferences cannot be taken as a single discount rate ibid, p. 23).
Based on experimental research, behavioral economists challenges the claims about
negligibility associated with constant discounting. Some of them even seem to take
A6 as an early step that might be relaxed on behalf of a generalized hyperbolic
discount function (Laibson 1994; Angeletos et al. 1998).
Diminishing marginal utility (A7) is an assumption that involves claims about
negligibility, justied by the idea that the factor `the individual prefers to
concentrate rather than to spread patterns of intertemporal consumption' can
be excluded from the analysis since its eect on the phenomenon under study
is negligibly small. Economists oer some evidence that support the claim that
most people within the economy opt for spreading their consumption over time.
Finally, the assumption of positive time preferences (A8) is an idealization that
refers to claims about negligibility. It is justied by the idea that the factor `the
individual prefers future to immediate consumption' plays negligible roles in the
production of economically relevant patterns of behavior (and therefore can be
removed). More recently, behavioral economists challenge this assumption and take
them sometimes as early step assumption that might be relaxed to allow for a model
of intertemporal choice that pursues the goal of scope expansion.
Based on the aforementioned assumptions, the DU model gives an account of
choice overtime in terms of maximization of a well-behaved discounted utility
function that represents an individual's preferences over a certain intertemporal
consumption prole. 6 The DU model oers a framework to deal with various
instances of consumption (and savings behavior). For instance, the model explains
why people live o their own (family) endowments in their early study and working
years, why they save more during mid life (their most productive working phase)
and why they live o saved income when they get retired (Modigliani and Brumberg
1954).
6 In a more generalized form, the discounted utility function is presented as Ut(c1;c2:::cT) = PT t
k=0 D(k):u(ct+k), where D(k) = (1=1 + )
k. The function U(:) denotes an additive instantaneous
function, the discount function D(k) represents the importance an individual assigns, in period t, to her
well-being (consumption) at the period t+k, and u(:) corresponds to an individual's unit of preference
satisfaction at a particular period of time.
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Based on the above attempt to classify the roles of the main DU assumptions,
I am inclined to argue that tractability considerations play an important inuence
on certain DU assumptions and even seem to justify the removal of explanatory
factors that do not play negligible eects on the phenomenon under study (for
an account of tractability considerations, see Hindriks (2005)). It is worth stressing
that behavioral economists also proceed similarly to neoclassical economists during
theory (model) construction. Even though they might complain about some
economists' strong commitment to parsimony and tractability, their very reformist
theorizing strategy is motivated by these values (Rabin 1998). For instance,
Kahneman et al. (1986) suggest that reforming the psychological foundations of
economic models does not go against the goal of developing parsimonious and
tractable accounts if this helps them to resolve choice anomalies and eventually
predict novel facts.
2.3. Anomalies as empirical sources of objections to the DU model
In order to persuade their fellow economists about the positive implications of
putting economics and psychology back together, behavioral researchers studying
intertemporal choice claim that some unrealistic assumptions like constant
discounting and independence constrain the predictive (explanatory) capabilities
of economic analysis. Intertemporal choice anomalies (i.e. empirical violations
of predictions by the DU model) are often cited as reasons for incorporating
new behavioral assumptions into the basic model. The underlying idea is that
modifying assumptions in the direction of more psychological realism (realisticness)
will contribute to prediction of economically important anomalies like savings
after retirement, overborrowing in credit cards, addiction and planning behaviors
(Camerer and Loewenstein 2003). 7
The most famous anomaly of choice over time is hyperbolic discounting. In
contrast to predictions made by the DU model, psychologists and economists found
evidence that agents often exhibit dynamic inconsistency. The latter refers to actual
patterns of choice behavior in which individual time preferences are traded-o
dierently. More specically, experimental ndings suggest that individuals reveal
present-biased (myopic) preferences when time delay is too short but often become
patient (i.e. willing to receive a delayed higher reward) as time goes by. In other
words, the term hyperbolic discounting sheds light on individuals with a declining
rate of time preference.
Thaler (1981) found evidence that individual time preferences might be
accurately represented by a hyperbole-shaped discount function. In order to be
indierent to gaining $15 immediately or receiving a higher delayed sum in 1 month,
7 This paper follows Uskali M aki's proposal of replacing the term realism by \realisticness". The latter
is regarded as an attribute of models and theories that represent and refer to entities, activities,
relationships existing in the objective world; whereas realism amounts to a class of philosophical
doctrines sharing the idea that scientic models and theories make statements with true value (because
they are about real occurrences in the world). For details, see M aki (1992, 1993, 1996, 1998).
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1 year and 10 years, average agents requested $20 for the month delay; $50 for a
year delay, and $200 for a 10 year-horizon. These ndings reveal average discount
rates of 345% (month-interval), 120% (delay of a year) and 19% (within a 10
year time-horizon). Frederick et al. (2003) oer evidence that when mathematical
functional forms are used to t the data for consumption over time, the hyperbolic
function (implying declining rate of discounting) ts better than the DU model's
exponential discount function (which involves a constant rate). There is also
evidence that people often prefer $110 in 31 days to $100 in 30 days but reveal
a preference reversal by opting for receiving $100 now to $110 tomorrow.
Laibson (1996) engages in a theorizing strategy that became popular even among
neoclassical economics. This might be so because he addresses his fellows by using
the same economic language of utility maximization and equilibrium explanation.
The novelty is to come up with another discounting functional form. More
precisely, Laibson modies the standard discount utility model by incorporating
a generalized hyperbolic discount function that enable him to account for puzzling
consumption-saving behaviors such as co-movement of income and consumption,
high rates of credit card debts in revolving credit markets, the phenomenon
of asset-specic propensity to consume, low levels of precautionary savings, the
strong correlation of patience levels with income, wealth and even age (Laibson
1994; Angeletos et al. 1998). The hyperbolic discounting model accommodates
phenomena such as procrastination and over consumption of addictive goods
O'Donoghue and Rabin (1999). In addition it predicts new phenomena like strategic
ignorance (i.e. why people sometimes do not acquire information even when it is
free). 8 This puzzling phenomenon can be explained in terms of the idea that
agents, who discount future consumption \hyperbolically", may be concerned with
withdrawing from a satisfactory course of action when its costs become imminent
and therefore opts no as this serves the role of a \commitment strategy".
Note that hyperbolic discounting became persuasive because it is often presented
as general principle to explain and predict many unrelated phenomena. This seems
to be an eective rhetoric strategy because the economics profession pursues the
ideal of \explaining much by little". In addition, replacing the assumption of
constant discounting with hyperbolic discounting seem to be a movement towards
making economic models of choice over time as realistic as possible. In Rabin's own
words,
If present-biased preferences are more behaviourally accurate than exponential
(constant) discounting, is the realism of importance to economics? Yes ... incorporating
present-biased preferences into economics likely to help us better understand savings
behavior... and other risky activities (Rabin 2002, p. 677).
Note that the above passage also reveals the rhetoric of empirical nding that
is valued highly by contemporary economists. 9 Behavioral economics persuades
8 For details, see Carrillo and Mariotti (2000).
9 I thank an anonymous referee for drawing my attention to the fact that behavioral economists push
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because it oers a chance to transform economics into an empirically progressive
science. This ideal is often invoked to justify their interdisciplinary research
methodology (Camerer and Loewenstein 2003).
3. A Persuasive Methodology also Faces Severe Limitations and
Objections
Based on Ariel Rubinstein's (2005) constructive criticisms about how behavioral
economists test and justify their assumptions, this section addresses methodological
problems that seem to be underestimated (and even ignored) by economists
fascinated by the developments of behavioral economics. I argue that behavioral
economists ought to be very careful about how to use their experimental ndings to
legitimize their reformed models. My idea is to challenge a behavioral economist's
vision that \as a rule, it is bad to spend time on methodological and broad stroke
issues rather than the nitty gritty of the phenomena being studied" (Rabin 2002,
p. 659).
The complexity of decision-making in the real economic world might motivate
behavioral economists to employ various research methods, such as hypothetical
choice experiments, animal studies, eld experiments and brain scans. Behavioral
economists often hesitate to dene their research agenda by their methodological
strategy. They take themselves as methodological eclectics interested in making
economic analysis as psychologically realistic as possible (Camerer and Loewenstein
2003). Despite the important contributions to explanatory progress that behavioral
economic models have brought, it is worth considering some troubling issues
associated with the development of empirical (experimental) studies needed for
justication of assumptions and hypothesis testing. As Guala and Mittone (2005)
properly put it,
Some economists have welcomed the experimental anomalies as the ultimate proof
that the fundamental principles of mainstream economics are awed and need drastic
revision. Others remain unconvinced and rebut by means of a simple but powerful
argument: economic models are supposed to be applicable to real economies not to the
articial conditions implemented in the economic lab.
In this section, we will see that many of the diculties refer (more or less directly)
to the Duhem Quine problem. The latter sheds light on the fact that any experiment
involves testing of at least two things { the hypothesis (on which a model or theory
is built) and a whole bunch of initial conditions and auxiliary assumptions. 10
This gives an extra boost to Lakatos' vision that no theory or model is ever killed
by empirical observation. There is always the possibility of rescue by auxiliary
hypotheses (Smith 1992).
the idea that their results and theoretical claims are grounded on empirical ndings a bit far.
10 Auxiliary assumptions and initial conditions might involve measurement techniques, incentives,
payments and so forth.
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3.1. Evidence from hypothetical choice experiments
As said, behavioral economic attempts to justify assumptions of their reformed
models by referring to ndings obtained from experiments. For instance, the
hypothesis of hyperbolic discounting is justied through dierent research methods.
Let us start with nding from hypothetical choice tasks. Thaler (1981) designed an
experiment in which participants are asked whether they would prefer one apple
today to two apples and another apple in 50 days to 2 apples in 51 days. He found
that most people opt for receiving an apple now to two apples tomorrow but prefer
two apples in 51 days to one apple in 50 days.
The foregoing evidence of time preference reversal ought to be interpreted more
carefully than behavioral economists often do. They rely on hypothetical situations
which might inuence agent's responses. Participants have no clear incentive to
exhibit their true time preferences. These results cannot deal well with the problem
called external validity (Loewenstein 1999, Guala 2005a). The latter refers to the
diculty with generalizing such ndings to the (outside) world. Some behavioral
economists do not take this problem very seriously because they encountered similar
ndings in replicated designs and the results seem to be intuitive.
3.2. Animal Studies
Hyperbolic discounting is also justied by evidence from animal studies. Some
experiments indicate that pigeons' current and future utilities are not traded-o
in constant fashion and discounting resembles a hyperbola-shaped function
(Ainslie 1992). One source of objection concerns doubts about whether data from
experiments with animals is useful for inferences about human behavior. The
problem of external validity is very serious. Therefore the design of the experiment
and its implications for human decision-making ought to be carefully scrutinized
(Rubinstein 2005). 11
3.3. Pros and Cons associated with eld experiments
Field experiments have become quite popular among behavioral economists.
They arise in response to many objections made to the validity of their experiments.
In the past, most participants were college students. Behavioral as well as
experimental economists have worked hard to run experiments in naturally
occurring environments (Camerer and Loewenstein 2003).
Economists interested in intertemporal choice `venture in the wild' so as to
develop improved experiments to test the phenomenon of dynamic inconsistency
11 I am grateful to the referee's remark that animal studies might not be the most important
research method employed by behavioral economists interested in more realistic accounts of human
decision-making. Yet I opted for briey citing it because it is part of the practicing psychological
economists' empirical research toolbox.
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(which cannot be accommodated by the basic DU model). Nowadays many try to
test the hypothesis that some anomalies arise from human capacity to adjust their
future preferences to positive or negative outcomes. Gilbert et al. (1998) asked
assistant professors of University of Texas to predict their future well-being at
various points in time subsequent to a positive or negative decision over tenure.
Subjects expected that their preferences would take 5 to 10 years to adjust to
any decision, but when interviewed years later, participants admitted that they
adjusted much faster and exaggerated the positive consequences associated with a
promotion. Sie et al. (1999) asked patients, who were about to take a HIV test,
to estimate their feelings about receiving a negative or positive result. They found
that subjects, when later interviewed, declared that they exaggerated how happy
they would feel on learning that they were HIV negative or how sad they would be
if turned out to be HIV positive.
The great advantage of eld studies is that they circumvent the problem of
external validity. Yet, it is important to stress that some problems emerge as soon
as we broaden our subjects and type of tasks. The demands for controlling various
factors like culture, gender are now much larger. This puts some constraints on our
capacity to draw conclusions about causal relations and make generalizations.
3.4. Using neuroeconomics to test and reform behavioral hypotheses
Brain scans are new research methods that behavioral economics use to test
their model's hypotheses. In the context of choice over time, McClure et al. (2004)
hypothesize that individuals ascribe strong important to immediate consumption
at the present but prefer to delay gratication as time goes by. They assume that
this phenomenon is represented by a quasi-hyperbolic discounting function. The
latter suggests that the discounted value of a consumption, u, at delay t = 0 is u
and tu for t > 0;0   ?1 and   1 (p. 504). The authors interpret the inverse of
 parameter as the value people give to immediate reward, whereas  treats a given
delay just equivalent independently of time period. Their main testable hypothesis
is that  and  parameters represent patterns of behavior { emotional and higher
order cognitive actions { activated by brain regions responsible for impulsiveness
(structures of the limbic system like ventral striatum) and areas responsible for
careful thinking (cortical system). They run a general linear regression in which 
and  refer to activated areas of the limbic system and cortical system, respectively.
The underlying idea is to nd evidence from magnetic resonance imaging to justify
the hypothesis that dynamic inconsistency is a result from activation of two neural
systems. Participants of this experiment made a series of binary choices between
smaller-immediate and higher-delayed reward while their brains were scanned
through magnetic resonance imaging. The specic amounts of rewards varied from
$5 to $40 and times of delay from the moment of the experiment to 6 weeks. Their
ndings conrm the behavioral economist's prediction that choice patterns that
involve immediate reward (no delay) is associated with higher activation of limbic
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structures, whereas courses of action that prefer delayed gratication involve more
activation of the prefrontal cortical areas associated with higher order thinking and
deliberation. The enthusiastic behavioral economist might not see the problems
associated with this kind of empirical study. The ndings oer no indisputable
reasons to conclude that human preferences are realistically represented by a quasi
hyperbolic function. Nor do they allow for conclusions that the limbic system
(striatum) is the physical substrate for parameter, whereas the higher cortical
regions (lateral prefrontal cortex and parietal cortex) are the counterpart of 
parameter.
Even though neuroeconomics might bring very revolutionary implications for
the development of causal explanations of human thinking and decision-making,
there are doubts about whether these neuroeconomic ndings can be easily
extrapolated to the world outside the lab. There are no indisputable reasons
for taking the foregoing empirical results as positive evidence for the hypothesis
that decision-making is driven by limbic and cortical brain systems. Another
serious problem is internal validity, which amounts to the diculty in knowing
whether a particular phenomenon or mechanism detected in a laboratory is correct
(Guala and Mittone 2005). These studies identify some statistical associations
(correlations) between variables (parameters) but there is no room for a 'causation
talk'. Furthermore, philosophers as well as some neuroscientists emphasize that
there is not yet a conception of what would be for a brain to make a decision
and the plausibility of regarding the information processing brain as a machine
composed of two competing systems, the emotional and the cognitive (Muramatsu
2006). 12
4. In Search of a Genuinely Progressive `Psychological Economics'
Despite the above discussion of methodological problems involved with the
practice of behavioral economics, it is important to stress that its reformist
theorizing strategies have contributed to opening up the black box of human
decision machinery. There seem to be two dierent types of strategy { an
incremental and a process-description.
4.1. Types of reformist theorizing strategies and their purposes
The incremental approach might be characterized by attempts to develop
behavioral models that add explaining items (e.g. behavioral assumptions about
individual time preferences) to the utility approach without questioning previously
included items of explanatory set. The process description approach involves
replacement of previously isolated explaining items with new explanantia ones.
12 For very recent methodological criticisms of neuroeconomics, see Harrisson (2008) and Gul and
Pesendorfer (2008).
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Behavioral economists following the above strategy challenge more clearly the
standard body of analysis than those following an incremental approach. They
substitute some explanatory factors playing a causal role in production of
actual choice behavior for assumptions about agent's rational preferences and
expectations. One distinctive trait of this theorizing approach concerns the
emphasis put on description of (causally relevant) processes or mechanisms
underlying patterns of actual choice behavior (anomalies included).
As to the domain of intertemporal choice, we can suggest that a great deal of
behavioral research still rely on an incremental reformist strategy. This movement
might be embedded in a rhetorical strategy. Perhaps behavioral economists
acknowledge that the profession prefers changes in small steps and do not want
to be regarded as rivals. Some like Rabin (2002) suggest that behavioral economics
is a natural continuation of neoclassical economics.
On behalf of the rhetoric of `assumptive realism', economists replace exponential
discounting with hyperbolic discounting. This paper acknowledges that there is
no indisputable evidence to suggest that hyperbolic discounting is the correct
(true?) representation of actual choice over time (despite evidence that hyperbolic
discounting sheds light on interesting and intuitive psychological phenomena
with economic implications). The behavioral economist's choice over hyperbolic
discounting is also dependent on pragmatic values { this functional form oers an
analytically convenient and parsimonious account of conicting time preferences.
Given the various challenges associated with changing and justifying new
functional forms of time discounting based on experimental ndings, I suggest
economists to pay attention to experimental methods of economics and other
sciences and follow professor Vernon Smith's and Ariel Rubinstein's advices so
as to avoid carelessly designed experiments to test and justify their models and
hypotheses (Smith 1987, 1994; Guala 2005; Rubinstein 2003, 2005). Once they
engage in this task, they may prot by developing models that uncover domain
specic emotional and higher order cognitive processes causally signicant for
actual choices. This probably requires a radical (revisionist) theorizing strategy
vis- a-vis the prevailing incremental analysis. This might converge on construction
of heuristic-based models that go beyond rhetorical appeals to the notion of
bounded rationality. The expected benet of this theorizing strategy is to come
up with a genuinely explanatory (causal) treatment of the complex machinery of
decision-making (Hausman 2001).
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper suggests that behavioral economics seems to be a reaction against
the theorizing and testing procedures of orthodox economics that have constrained
its explanatory and predictive capabilities. Although it shares the view that the
reformist strategies employed by psychological economists contributes to improved
accounts of intertemporal choice anomalies, it raises some objections to the ways
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in which some practicing behavioral researchers use experimental ndings so as to
legitimate the rather incremental modications that they make in their behavioral
models. The main lesson drawn from this article is that the `aim to improve the
explanatory power of economic analysis' might be more eectively achieved by a
fresh and eventually revolutionary theorizing strategy that uncovers (mental and
neural) processes with major roles in the production of actual choice behavior. This
is because it oers the possibility of distinguishing signicant causal processes from
spurious correlations and of grasping how aective and cognitive factors operate
together in the causal chain of events that bring about important behavior patterns
(anomalies included). A revisionist movement towards an economic explanation
in this richer, causal sense is worth developing since it provides that required
knowledge for eective predictions of behavior and informs us about how to behave
to bring about certain choice patterns or to prevent them. Fundamentally, an
improved account of the complex and pervasive phenomenon of decision-making
over time might help us to design more eective policies and institutions than the
existing ones. This is because one of the most interesting implications of behavioral
economics is its disposition to explicitly address the question of whether economics
can be treated as social therapy.
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